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Abstract—Usable user authentication is an important re-
search topic. The traffic signature-based approach is a new
authentication technology that identifies the devices used by
online users based on traffic signatures, where the traffic sig-
nature is a statistic of the video stream delivered by the au-
thentication server to the user device. This approach has two
advantages. First, users need not do any operations regarding
the device identification. Second, users need not be sensitive
to the privacy loss and computer theft. In this paper, an au-
thor evaluates the uniqueness and reproducibility of the sig-
nature by introducing a function that quantifies the distance
between two signatures. Through number of experiments is
demonstrated that the process interference approach has the
advantage of generating new signatures that are sufficiently
distinguishable from one another.
Keywords—user authentication, traffic signature, HTTP stream-
ing, packet capture, variance plot.
1. Introduction
User authentication is mostly based on passwords. A pass-
word-hacking exercise, however, demonstrated that a large
number of passwords can easily be cracked [1]. Accord-
ingly, users who place high value on their accounts should
adopt a more robust authentication strategy. Since the
United States Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council officially recommended the use of multi-factor au-
thentication in 2005 [2], various authentication technolo-
gies have been proposed, where multi-factor authentication
requires a prover to provide more than one distinct factors
to a verifier and there are three distinct authenticating fac-
tors: what you have (e.g. house keys), what you know (e.g.
passwords), and what you are (e.g. fingerprints) [3], [4].
Current what you have authentication schemes add an addi-
tional hardware device to a desktop/laptop PC. Such a de-
vice is, for example, a security token, smartphone, or
trusted platform module (TPM). Unfortunately, they are not
widely used today because they are complex, lead to a loss
of privacy, reduce control of the computer, or need to be
protected against device theft [3]. Number of authors ar-
gue that users’ capabilities and understanding should be
factored into the design of security technologies [5], [6].
In [7] is proposed another what you have authentication
scheme, which identifies the machines users are operating
to access their accounts. Presented in [7] approach is based
on video traffic analysis. The authentication server delivers
a video stream and the user device records packet arrival
times to calculate a traffic signature. The server then ver-
ifies whether the obtained signature agrees with the one
obtained before or the one registered previously. Recently,
some online banks request users to show their countersigns,
when users try to sign-in using devices that are different
from those they used to use. The difference can be de-
tected using the client environment carried by the HTTP
protocol, which includes an IP address, a browser type,
etc. This scheme roughly distinguishes user computer plat-
forms, whereas author’s approach, shown in [7], precisely
distinguishes them based on their unique signatures. As
long as user machines are correctly identified, users do not
need to be aware of anything about the machine identifi-
cation since signatures are calculated and verified without
intervention from users.
Contrarily, the current three major what-you-have authenti-
cation technologies, which deliver codes via the security to-
ken, email (or SMS), or an app running on a portable device
(e.g. smartphone) [8], direct users to do some operations,
such as starting the device/app and typing in the code. In
addition, as opposed to previous authentication schemes, in
which a single device/app generates codes based on some
algorithm, the traffic signature is formed through the in-
teractions among numbers of elements, which include not
only hardware and software components of the user plat-
form but also the server, video coding techniques, commu-
nication protocols that affect statistics of video traffic [9].
Since the interactions are not simple, it is difficult to infer
the signature even if detail specifications of the user and
server machines are given.
Meanwhile, a TPM chip into which unique RSA keys have
been burnt can strictly identify the user machine [10]. This
PKI-based approach strongly connects a user device to its
owner, so that owners must pay careful attention to a pri-
vacy loss and unit theft. Some mechanisms that minimize
the risk when stolen are a priori integrated (e.g. platform
integrity). Unfortunately, these extra attention and mecha-
nisms may cause the usability problems. Contrarily, in au-
thor’s approach, users do not have to be sensitive to these
risks since the signatures appear only in the authentication
process and there is no personal identity-related information
on the user device.
The PKI-based approach is also costly. As discussed in [5],
authentication solutions must be accessible to all online
users not just in terms of knowledge and effort but also in
terms of cost. The authors in [5] quote that older users, who
have much to gain from online participation, might be un-
able or unwilling to own a smartphone, which is the second
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factor of choice in many authentication solutions currently
deployed or planned. Presented approach demands video
delivery. The HTTP-based streaming technologies are used
because they are inexpensive and widely used today [11].
They avoid NAT and firewall traversal issues and provide
cost effectiveness since there is not need dedicated stream-
ing servers for video delivery.
The previous author’s work [7] introduced the traffic sig-
nature and discussed its sensitivity to the user machine.
This paper evaluates the signature through numbers of ex-
periments and clarifies its uniqueness and reproducibility.
Section 2 introduces the traffic signature and briefly out-
lines the result in [7]. Section 3 defines the distance be-
tween two signatures, based on which uniqueness and re-
producibility are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 investi-
gates which components of the user machine or interactions
among them dominantly participate in forming the signa-
ture. The findings in this section are effective not only
in enhancing reproducibility, but also in allowing users to
have different signatures even if their machines consist of
the same hardware components. Finally, Section 6 presents
the conclusions.
2. Traffic Signature
First decay rate is defined, which is derived from the vari-
ance plot [12]. Decay rate β (m) indicates how fast traffic
variability declines at time scale m. It depends on various
factors (e.g., computer hardware and software implemen-
tation, protocols, propagation delays, and bandwidth) and
the dominant factors vary with m. The following describes
how to calculate β (m). Let Xk denote the number of arriv-
ing packets during the k-th time interval of length δ , where
δ = 10−5 s. The m aggregated series {X (m)k } are obtained
by dividing time series {Xk} into blocks of length m and
averaging the series over each block as
X (m)` =
1
m
`m
∑
i=`m−m+1
Xi, ` = 1,2, . . . ,bN/mc, (1)
where m is a positive integer, N is the size of series {Xk},
and bxc is the largest integer that does not exceed x. The
sample variance of {X (m)k } is given by
V (m) =
1
bN/mc−1
bN/mc
∑
k=1
(X (m)k − flX)
2, (2)
where flX = 1N ∑
N
i=1 Xi. Hereafter it is assumed that aggre-
gation levels mi, i = 0,1, . . . , take real numbers. The decay
rate at level mi is defined as
β (mi) = log
(
V (bmi+1c)/V (bmic)
)
, (3)
where m0 = 1 and mi+1 > mi. Throughout the paper,
log mi+1mi = log
N
50 ·
1
21 for all i, and N = 6 · 10
6. The traf-
fic signature is twenty decay rates β1,β2, . . . ,β20, where βi
is used to indicate β (mi) for simplicity.
2.1. Experimental System
Unless otherwise mentioned, all results in this paper are
obtained using the experimental system in Fig. 1. In the
figure, the client PC (C-PC) accesses France 24 live
(IP = 213.205.104.131), a news channel based in France,
using the Internet Explorer Flash Player add-on. This on-
line news is delivered at a constant rate (448 Kb/s) us-
ing the TCP protocol. In Fig. 1, all packets destined for
C-PC are copied to the attacker’s PC (A-PC) by the port-
mirroring hub, so that not only C-PC but also A-PC col-
lects video packets from the server with WinDump [13] to
calculate signatures. Hereinafter, signatures calculated on
C-PC (resp. A-PC) are referred to as user (resp. attacker)
signatures. The news channel France 24 live was used be-
cause there are 30 routers between the news server and
C-PC and the round-trip time is approximately 283 ms.
Such a long-distance communication generates highly vari-
able video traffic. Practical signatures should be stable in
this case.
France 24 live
Internet
Port-mirroring
hub
Client PC (C-PC)
Attacker’s PC (A-PC)
Fig. 1. The port-mirroring hub copies all packets destined for
C-PC to A-PC.
2.2. Previous Results
In this subsection the results presented in [7] are briefly
introduced. Four machines in Table 1 are used as C-PC
in Fig. 1. Although they are all Windows machines, their
software and hardware components are somewhat different.
Figures 2 and 3 show their attacker and user signatures, re-
spectively. Throughout the paper, ten samples are obtained
for each signature {βi}1≤i≤20 to see the stability of each
decay rate βi. From the figures, decay rates {βi}1≤i≤16 are
mostly stable, while {βi}17≤i≤20 are not. This is mainly
because the number of samples X (bmic)k decreases as an in-
crease in i. It can be seen that attacker signatures (Fig. 2)
are all similar. In contrast, distinct differences exist between
any two user signatures in Fig. 3.
Table 1
Four Windows machines a-d used in the experiment
C-PC Model Purchase OS
a XPS420 Jun. 2008 Vista, 32 bits
b XPS435T Jul. 2010 Windows 7, 64 bits
c XPS9100 Jul. 2011 Windows 7, 64 bits
d Inspiron Jan. 2012 Windows 7, 64 bits
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Fig. 2. Attacker signatures (measured on A-PC): (a), (b), (c), and (d) correspond to machines a, b, c, and d from Table 1, respectively.
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Fig. 3. User signatures (measured on C-PC): (a), (b), (c), and (d) correspond to machines a, b, c, and d from Table 1, respectively.
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Next the difference between user and attacker signatures
is shown. From Figs. 2 and 3, user signatures are dif-
ferent from attacker signatures typically at levels m satis-
fying log(m) < 2. Note that m = 102 corresponds to the
time scale of one millisecond since 102δ = 10−3 s. The
port-mirroring hub never affects variances at this large time
scale. The following is author’s explanation for this phe-
nomenon. The difference occurs because A-PC performs
only packet collection, while C-PC performs both packet
collection and packet processing. On C-PC, the two jobs
are executed in parallel on every packet arrival. The two
jobs interfere with each other and this interference makes
the execution time to obtain the current time fluctuate.
In brief, the difference is due to inaccurate packet arrival
timestamps caused by resource (memory, CPU, etc.) com-
petition between two jobs. Hence, signatures in Fig. 3 differ
only at small time scales. Furthermore, the TCP protocol
intensifies the competition because packets tend to arrive
in batches when the protocol is used. Since the interfer-
ence is influenced by various factors (e.g. I/O controllers,
device drivers, and job scheduling), it is conjectured that
different machine models in Table 1 generated different
signatures.
3. Signature Distance
Previous work does not quantify the difference between
two signatures [7]. This section first defines the distance
between them. Let {β ai } and {β bi } denote user signatures
of machines a and b, respectively. They are distinguishable
if there exists at least one integer i at which |β ai −β bi | is
sufficiently large. Therefore, the research is focused on the
distance between the i-th decay rates β ai and β bi .
Figure 4 shows the histogram of 100 β1 samples and the
normal Q-Q plot, which compares the 100 β1 samples
with the theoretical normal distribution. From the figure,
β1 has a distribution close to the normal distribution. The
normality tests were performed using 100 βi samples. If
1 ≤ i ≤ 14, both the Shapiro-Wilk and Anderson-Darling
tests do not reject the null hypothesis stating that the βi sam-
ples are normally distributed when the significance level α
is 0.01. Therefore, this paper uses only {βi}1≤i≤14 for au-
thentication and assumes that β ai and β bi for 1≤ i≤ 14 are
independent and each has a normal distribution.
Let µai and σ ai be the sample mean and standard devia-
tion obtained from ten β ai samples. If µai > µbi , the dis-
tance between β ai and β bi must be a decrease function of
Pr(β ai < β bi ), the probability that a sample of β ai is smaller
than that of β bi . Let F(x; µ ,σ 2) be the cumulative distri-
bution function (CDF) of normal distribution N(µ ,σ 2). If
µai > µbi , the probability Pr(β ai < β bi ) is given by
Pr(β ai < β bi ) = F(0; |µai −µbi |,(σ ai )2 +(σ bi )2). (4)
Meanwhile, if µai < µbi , Pr(β ai > β bi ) is equal to the right
hand side of Eq. (4). Therefore, independent of whether
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Fig. 4. The histogram and normal Q-Q plot obtained from 100
β1 samples.
µai < µbi or not, di(a,b), the distance between decay ratesβ ai and β bi , is defined as
di(a,b) =− logF(0; |µai −µbi |,(σ ai )2 +(σ bi )2). (5)
Note that di(a,b) is a decrease function of Pr(β ai < β bi ) if
µai > µbi .
Also the D(a,b), the distance between two signatures {β ai }
and {β bi }, is defined as
D(a,b) = |{i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 14}|di(a,b)≥ Li}| . (6)
Briefly, D(a,b) is the number of integers i that satisfy
di(a,b) ≥ Li, where threshold Li, which is obtained later,
determines whether the i-th decay rates of two signatures
are the same or not. Two distance functions d and D have
the following features: di(a,b) = di(b,a), D(a,b) = D(b,a),
di(a,b)≥ di(a,a)=− log0.5(≈ 0.3), D(a,b)≥D(a,a) = 0,
and they do not satisfy the triangle inequality.
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3.1. Signature Verification
Algorithm 1 shows the signature verification procedure As.
In the algorithm, { β bi } indicates the most recently obtained
sample signature of machine b. Let G be the set of all
user machines that request signature verification. Given
a(∈ G) and {βi}, procedure As returns “accept” if {βi} is
considered as a signature of machine a; otherwise, it returns
“reject”. If accepted, { β ai }= {βi}.
Algorithm 1: Signature verification procedure As.
Require: For any b ∈ Ga, D(a,b)≥ 1.
1: procedure As(a,{βi})
2: while Ga is not empty do
3: Select b ∈ Ga
4: Ga← Ga \{b}
5: for i = 1 to 14 do
6: if di(a,b)≥ Li then
7: if (µai −µbi )(βi− β bi )≤ 0 then
8: return reject
9: end if
10: end if
11: end for
12: end while
13: return accept
14: end procedure
The verification is performed by comparing the signa-
ture {βi} with signatures of other machines. Let Ga be
the set of machines that are used for verifying a signature
of machine a. The procedure works under the condition
that for any b∈Ga, {β ai } and {β bi } are distinguishable, i.e.
D(a,b)≥ 1, for any b ∈ Ga. (7)
In the 7th line of Algorithm 1, an inequality
(µai −µbi )(βi− β bi )≤ 0 (8)
implies that the magnitude relation between µai and µbi is
different from that between βi and β bi . Note that Perror, the
probability that inequality (8) holds, is
Perror = 10−di(a,b). (9)
This seldom occurs if di(a,b)≥ Li (in the 6th line of Algo-
rithm 1) holds for a large Li. Thus, the procedure considers
that {βi} is not a signature of machine a and returns reject.
Procedure As returns accept after it makes t comparisons,
where t = ∑b∈Ga D(a,b). Therefore, Pf orge, the probabil-
ity that an attacker successfully forges a signature that is
accepted by the procedure, is
Pf orge = 2−t (10)
if the attacker has no information about the signature of
machine a. The forgery probability exponentially decreases
with t.
Algorithm 1 needs statistics µai , µbi , σ ai , and σ bi for cal-
culating D(a, b) and di(a, b). It is recommended that
µai , σ ai , and Ga should be updated by using the latest sam-
ples because these statistics may be affected by various
software updates (e.g. Windows update).
3.2. Requirements
The traffic signature-based authentication has the same tar-
gets of challenge as biometric-based authentication, where
biometric information (e.g., fingerprint, iris, etc.) is re-
quired to hold three requirements [14]:
• R1 – it is sufficiently different between any two users,
• R2 – it is reproducibly captured repeatedly,
• R3 – it is hard to be faked.
This paper focuses on R1 and R2. Before verifying whether
traffic signatures satisfy R1 and R2, there is need to deter-
mine the values of {Li}, which are criteria for determining
whether the i-th decay rates of two signatures are different
or not. This paper decomposes Li into two parts as
Li = Ls +∆Li, (11)
where Ls(> 0) is the distance required by security strength
and ∆Li(> 0) denotes the fluctuation range of distance di
caused by changes in CPU and network loads, etc. Require-
ment R1 demands that an integer i that satisfies di(a,b)≥ Li
for any a and b should exist, and R2 insists that ∆Li should
be sufficiently small. In the next section, ∆Li values are
experimentally derived.
First the value of Ls such that the authentication system
satisfies the following capability is determined. A user
accesses the system every one minute and As returns reject
once in a year on average. Assume that ∆Li = 0 and that for
all b∈Ga and for all i satisfying di(a,b)≥ Ls, di(a,b) = Ls.
Then, the mean of the binomial distribution indicates that
60 ·24 ·365 ·
(
1− (1−10−Ls)t
)
= 1, (12)
where t = ∑b∈Ga D(a,b). From Eqs. (9) and (10), both Ls
and t should be enlarged as much as possible for minimizing
both Perror and Pf orge. From Eq. (12), the Ls and t at the
same time can’t be reduced. If t = 20, from Eq. (12),
Ls ≈ 7. In this case, from Eqs. (9) and (10), Perror ≈ 10−7
and Pf orge ≈ 10−6 (i.e. the security strength corresponds to
a six-digit code). Hereinafter, Ls = 7 is used.
4. Signature Analysis
4.1. Four Machines
This section discusses whether traffic signatures satisfy in-
equality (7) by using machine set G = {a,b,c,d}, which
consists of four machines listed in Table 1, under the condi-
tion that fluctuation ∆Li = 0. Figure 5 exhibits distances di
derived from user signatures of machines in G. It can be
seen from Figs. 3 and 5 that di, 1≤ i≤ 14, correctly quan-
tify signature differences. Let us see the distance between
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Fig. 5. Distances di for all machine pairs in Table 1 – “a-b” in-
dicates di(a,b).
signatures of machines a and b (“a-b” in Fig. 5). From
the figure, di(a,b) > Li(= 7) at i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Therefore,
D(a,b) = 5. Similarly, D(a,c) = D(a,d) = 5, D(b,d) = 2,
and D(b,c) = D(c,d) = 1. Accordingly, (7) holds for all
sets Gx, x = a,b,c,d when Gx = G \ {x}. Figure 5 also
shows that for any x,y 6= a, D(a,y)≥D(x,y). Namely, ma-
chine a creates the most characteristic signature. This may
be because from Table 1, machine a is the oldest PC (there-
fore, it may be composed of many unique devices) and its
Windows version is different from those of the others.
4.2. Fluctuation Range
Next the fluctuation range ∆Li discussed in Subsection 3.2
is estimated. Let ∆di be the decrease in the distance di(x,y)
caused by the increase in the load of machine x, i.e.
∆di = di(x,y)−di( x,y), (13)
where x denotes machine x whose load has been raised. The
author estimates the distribution of ∆di through experiments
with various machines x, and then determine ∆Li such that
∆di is not greater than ∆Li with probability 0.95 (Pr(∆di ≤
∆Li) = 0.95).
From Eq. (13), mean µyi and variance (σ
y
i )
2 of machine y
are necessary to obtain ∆di. These values are independent
of β xi and β x˜i . However, y should be as normal as possible.
Therefore, one can assume that variance (σ yi )
2 is equal to
the mean of variances (σ xi )
2 of various machines x, i.e.,
(σ yi )
2 = m
(
(σ xi )
2) , (14)
where this paper uses m(Zi) and s(Zi) to indicate the mean
and standard deviation of samples {Zi}. On the other hand,
µyi can be determined by assuming that due to the load
increase, the distance decreases to Ls, i.e.
di( x,y) = Ls. (15)
From Eqs. (13) and (15), we have
di(x,y) = ∆di +Ls. (16)
In short, the load increase lowers the distance from Ls +∆di
to Ls. Using Eqs. (5) and Eqs. (14), (15) and (16) are re-
written as
− logF
(
0; |µ x˜i −µ
y
i |,(σ
x˜
i )
2 +m(σ xi )
2) = Ls (17)
− logF
(
0; |µxi −µ
y
i |,(σ
x
i )
2 +m(σ xi )
2) = ∆di +Ls. (18)
Given µ x˜i and (σ x˜i )2 + m(σ xi )2, (17) has two solutions µ
y
i ,
so that (17) and (18) yield two ∆di values for each x. The
24 ∆di values are obtained using various desktop and lap-
top PCs x. For measuring signatures of x, the CPU, mem-
ory, and hard disk utilization rates are raised by playing
a video (whose bitrate is 2.4 Mb/s) stored on the hard disk.
The Shapiro-Wilk and Anderson-Darling tests do not reject
the normality of 24 ∆di samples for all i = 1, 2, . . . , 14.
Thus, this paper assumes that ∆di has a normal distribution.
Using mean m(∆di) and standard deviation s(∆di), ∆Li is
given by
∆Li = m(∆di)+ z0.95s(∆di), (19)
where z0.95 satisfies F(z0.95;0,1) = 0.95; i.e., Pr(∆di ≤
∆Li) = 0.95. Table 2 shows m(∆di), s(∆di), and ∆Li de-
rived from ∆di samples. From the table, fluctuation ranges
∆Li depend on i and are between 2.5 and 5. If ∆Li val-
ues in Table 2 are used for calculating Li in Eq. (11), we
have D(x,y)≥ 1 for all x,y∈G in Subsection 4.1 except for
D(c,d). Therefore, in equality (7) does not hold. In other
words, the four machine models do not satisfy requirement
R1 in Subsection 3.2. In Section 5, author improves signa-
ture uniqueness to fulfill the requirement.
Table 2
Means m(∆di), standard deviations s(∆di),
and fluctuation ranges ∆Li for i = 1,2, . . . ,14
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
m(∆di) –0.1 –0.2 0.3 –0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1
s(∆di) 2.6 1.9 2.3 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.2
∆Li 4.2 2.9 4.1 2.9 3.3 3.7 3.7
i 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
m(∆di) 0.3 –0.1 0.0 0.9 1.3 –0.4 0.0
s(∆di) 2.4 1.9 2.1 2.5 2.3 1.7 2.3
∆Li 4.2 3.0 3.4 5.0 5.0 2.5 3.8
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Fig. 6. User signatures for (a) g1, (b) g8, (c) g16, and (d) g32.
5. Uniqueness Improvement
So far the case where different machine models yield
different signatures was considered. This result suggests
that replacing some hardware or software components of
C-PC might produce signatures that satisfy requirements
R1 and R2. This section discusses the way how to change
user signatures without adding a hardware device to C-PC.
Note that as mentioned in the previous section, changing
user signatures is often necessary for security.
5.1. Process Interference
One approach for uniqueness improvement is to increase the
number of WinDump processes on C-PC. Let gk denote
machine g on which k WinDump processes are running.
Figure 6 shows user signatures for g1, g8, g16, and g32.
As shown in the figure, each number k creates a unique
signature.
Figure 7 exhibits distances di between signatures of g1
and gk, k > 1. The figure demonstrates that the process
interference-based approach generates many distinguishable
signatures since D(g1,gk) ≥ 1 for k ∈ {4,8,16,32}. Fig-
ure 7 also provides the following attractive facts:
• distances di(g1,gk) at 1≤ i≤ 4 increase with k,
• numbers i that satisfy di(g1,gk)≥ Li increase with k.
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Fig. 7. The impact of the number of WinDump processes on
distances di – “1-4” indicates di(g1,g4).
The author conjectures that these phenomena arise due to
process interference. Every time a packet arrives at C-PC,
a packet processing process and k WinDump processes all
start at once, so that they severely compete for CPU and
buffer resources if k is large. Number k represents the de-
gree of competition. As k increases, packet arrival times-
tamps become more inaccurate, and this inaccuracy result
in the emergence of unique user signatures.
The process interference approach is neither CPU nor mem-
ory intensive. Therefore this approach can be considered
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as a key technology for traffic signature-based user authen-
tication.
5.2. Other Approaches
This subsection explores other possible approaches for pro-
ducing unique signatures and investigates whether they are
available under various hardware and software configura-
tions. Experiments were made with 14 machines e-r, whose
system information is listed in Table 3. The research is
focused on Windows machines because most of personal
desktop and laptop PCs use Windows OS. For compari-
son, Mac and Linux machines are included in the table.
On Mac and Linux machines, tcpdump [15] runs instead
of WinDump. Since their packet analysis mechanisms are
different [16], experimental results may depend on which
of them is used. The table also shows the maximum dis-
tances (maxi di) between signatures measured before and
after each of the following three operations:
Snaplen: The snapshot length of each packet collected by
WinDump or tcpdump is increased to 4096 bytes (the de-
fault is 68 bytes). As a result of this, a larger data amount
are stored in the hard disk.
Interfer: Eight WinDump (or tcpdump) processes are ex-
ecuted so that they severely compete for CPU and memory
resources. Figure 6 is the result obtained by this operation
with machine g in Table 3.
Load: The machine workload is raised by executing eight
VLC media players [17], all of which play a video file on
the hard disk.
In Table 3, symbol } implies that the operation has an
ability to create distinguishable signatures, and ◦ indicates
that distinguishable signatures may be obtained if the oper-
ation is adequately tuned (e.g. the snapshot length further
increases). The table shows the following three results:
• the snapshot length-based approach may not yield
long distances,
• the load-based approach is not suited to laptop PCs
since the online news may abnormally terminate,
• the process interference-based approach is the most
effective and stable approach.
However, this approach should be adequately tuned since
maxi di depends on the machine configuration. Some ma-
chines require a large number of WinDump (or tcpdump)
processes.
An advantage of the process interference-based approach is
that a variety of recent and ongoing computer technologies
keep producing unique and unpredictable signatures. Even
if detail hardware and software specification of C-PC is
given, obtaining user signatures through computation must
Table 3
Three operations are performed to see whether they can
yield distinguishable signatures under various machine
configurations of C-PC. Symbols } and ◦ indicate
maxi di ≥ Li and 2 < maxi di < Li, respectively. Numbers
in parentheses denote maxi di
PC OS CPU Snaplen Interfer Load
e Vista Q9450 ◦ (5)
f
Win 7
i5-2400S (2) } (54)
g i7-930 } (18) } (51)
h i7-960 ◦ (5) } (104) ◦ (3)
i i3-2120 ◦ (6) } (69) ◦ (3)
j i7-2600 } (62) } (90)
k i3-2130 ◦ (3) } (37)
l
Win 8
i5-3350P } (16) } (56)
m i7-4770 } (15) } (37) } (13)
n (1)
Win 7
AMD } (12) } (66) (4)
o (1) Atom } (38) (4)
p (1) Win 8 i5-3317U } (24) } (59)
q Linux i7-3770K (3)
r MAC i7-2630 ◦ (5)
Notes:
(1) n, o, p – laptop computers.
(2) maxi di = 2 at 16 processes.
(3) maxi di = 2 at 64 processes.
(4) The online news abnormally terminates.
be a difficult task. At the same time, however, new com-
puter technologies make maxi di variable, so that the num-
ber of WinDump processes may need to be revised. The au-
thor considers the following recent technologies must have
impacts on di:
Timestamp precision: WinPcap (a Windows library used
by WinDump) by default obtains the timestamp through
kernel function KeQueryPerformanceCounter(), which pro-
vides a time reference with microsecond precision. By mod-
ifying a registry key, timestamps are generated through
faster i386 instruction RDTSC, which accesses TimeStamp
Counter (TSC), whose precision is equivalent to the CPU
frequency. RDTSC works only on Intel CPUs and is ex-
pected to provide nanosecond time resolution [18], [19].
Multiprocessing: A packet received by a NIC is stored in
the NIC driver buffer. The timestamp of the packet is mea-
sured after the capture driver is invoked through a hard-
ware interrupt. If there are pending interrupts, the driver
is executed after all these interrupts are served. There-
fore, the timestamp is significantly inaccurate if there are
a large number of pending interrupts [18]. WinPcap works
on symmetric multi-processing (SMP) machines. Multiple
processors concurrently execute the same instance of the
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capture driver, so that each processor handles a different
packet stored in the NIC driver buffer. Accordingly, the
delay of the driver execution depends on the number of
processors [20].
Turbo Boost: Turbo Boost is a technology that enables the
processor to run above its base operating frequency when
workload on the processor calls for faster performance. The
timestamp accuracy is affected by the technology since it
dynamical changes processing capability.
5.3. Traffic Control
Some traffic control software tools effectively create unique
signatures (probably because they frequently consult the
current time). Traffic control is performed to reduce con-
gestion, latency and packet loss by prioritizing, controlling,
or reducing the network traffic. One of the traffic control
tools is dummynet [21]. It emulates a network link that
consists of a transmission link with fixed bandwidth B and
propagation delay tD and a finite FIFO queue with tail-
drop. For link emulation, dummynet delays each packet i
by (`i +Qi)/B+ tD, where `i is the length of packet i and
Qi is queue occupation when packet i was queued.
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Fig. 8. The impact of: (a) propagation delay tD and (b) band-
width B on the distance. “100 ms” indicates the distance between
two signatures measured at tD = 0 and tD = 100 ms. “3r− 5r”
indicates the distance between two signatures measured at B = 3r
and B = 5r.
Figure 8a shows distances between signatures measured at
tD = 0 and tD > 0, where dummynet on C-PC delays every
incoming and outgoing packets by tD. Since video quality
deteriorates greatly when tD = 500 ms, the TCP window
scale option [22], which allows larger windows to be used,
is set to work when tD = 500 ms. The figure demonstrates
that maxi di is too small to distinguish signatures for all tD
values. On the other hand, as shown in Fig. 8b, dummynet
bandwidth B is useful in raising maxi di greatly. From the
figure, maxi di exceeds 100 at multiple values of i. By
looking closely at Fig. 8b, it can be seen that in the case
of “∞− 3r”, maxi di > 100 at i ∈ {2,3,4,5,6,12}, where
“∞−3r” denotes the distance between two signatures mea-
sured at B = ∞ (i.e. the bandwidth is unlimited) and B = 3r,
where r is the average rate of the video stream. Note that
perceived video quality is not degraded as long as B is at
least three times greater than r. All approaches in Sub-
section 5.2. change user signature {βi} only at small time
scales i (e.g. i ≤ 5), whereas by changing bandwidth B,
{βi} varies at large i (e.g. 9≤ i≤ 14). This is an important
advantage of this approach.
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B = 4500 Kbps
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10 100
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Fig. 9. A larger B requires a larger ∆B to satisfy D ≥ 1. The
solid line denotes max1≤i≤14 Li.
Figure 9 shows maxi di between two signatures obtained
when the dummynet bandwidths are B and B + ∆B Kb/s.
The solid line in the figure denotes max1≤i≤14 Li(= 12),
so that D≥ 1 if maxi di is above the line. From the figure,
one can roughly estimate how many distinguishable sig-
natures one can be obtained by changing the bandwidth,
because the figure explains how maxi di increases with
∆B and how the minimum ∆B that satisfies D ≥ 1 grows
with B. For example, one can get roughly ten distinguish-
able signatures in the range of 500≤ B≤ 1000 Kb/s since
from the figure, the smallest ∆B that satisfies D≥ 1 is ap-
proximately 50 Kb/s in the range.
6. Conclusions
For protecting users who place high value on their ac-
counts, various what you have authentication technologies
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have been proposed. However, they are not widely used
today mainly because security hardware added to the user
machines poses other new problems. Additional hardware
is not necessary if the user machine itself is identified. In
this paper, the feasibility of applying the traffic signature to
the user machine identification has been discussed, where
the signature is calculated from HTTP-based video traffic
transmitted by the authentication server. This paper focused
on uniqueness and reproducibility of the signature based on
the distance function defined in this paper and obtained the
following results:
Uniqueness was verified based on a criterion, which re-
quires that the distance between any two signatures is not
less than Ls +∆Li, where Ls = 7 and ∆Li is the fluctuation
range of the i-th decay rate. The security strength corre-
sponds to a six-digit code when Ls = 7. Although different
machine configuration models tended to provide different
signatures, these signatures did not always meet the crite-
rion. However, the process interference approach, in which
the number of executing packet-capture processes is used
as a parameter for controlling the accuracy of packet ar-
rival timestamps, was shown to be effective for producing
signatures that meet the criterion.
Reproducibility was verified by calculating signatures
from real Internet traffic delivered by France 24 live. Al-
though the traffic traversed 30 routers and experienced
a long propagation delay, signatures measured on vari-
ous machines were stable especially over small time scales.
Sample signatures showed that the fluctuation ranges ∆Li
were between 2.5 and 5. Therefore, 9.5≤ Ls + ∆Li ≤ 12.
When the machine load is highly increased by playing eight
video files in parallel, five machines out of fourteen gener-
ated signatures that exceed Ls +∆Li. Therefore, some ma-
chines need to reduce their loads before performing the
authentication. However, dummynet, a traffic control tool,
is expected to mitigate the impact of the load because
dummynet generated many signatures whose distances
from the original signature were significantly large (more
than 100).
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